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Abstract 
In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, the world’s largest provider of public finance, 
experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. In response, the governments of Belgium, France, and 
Luxembourg provided the company a capital infusion and credit support. In February 2010, 
the company adopted a European Union (EU)-approved restructuring plan that required it 
to scale back its businesses and cease proprietary trading. In June 2011, Dexia withdrew 
from the government-sponsored credit support program before its expiration date, and in 
July, the company announced that it had passed an EU stress test. However, just three 
months later, Dexia wrote down its substantial position in Greek debt and posted its largest 
loss ever. The company’s shares plummeted, and its Common Equity Tier 1 capital became 
negative. To avoid a disorderly resolution, the governments of Belgium, France, and 
Luxembourg nationalized Dexia’s assets. This case examines the attempted rescue of Dexia, 
provides an analysis of the successes and failures of that cross-border effort, and discusses 
the impact that Dexia’s holdings of sovereign debt had on the company’s viability and on the 




1 This module is one of four produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), considering the 
European Banking Union. Other modules are:  
• European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism  
• European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism  
• European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution—Fortis Group 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability. 
3 Economist, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt/Main Financial Stability Department and Research Department. 
This coauthor’s contribution represents her personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.  
4 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of Management. 
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1.   Introduction  
In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, a Belgian-French financial institution that was a leader 
in public finance experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. The company’s financial position was 
stressed from two sources: possible losses in its US subsidiary because of exposure to the 
subprime mortgage market and a multibillion euro credit to a troubled Irish real estate 
financial institution. The governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg rallied to 
provide Dexia a capital infusion of €6.4 billion, and to guarantee up to €150 billion of its 
liabilities and bonds in order to keep it afloat. Since Dexia had a New York banking office, the 
company also borrowed as much as $58.5 billion from the US Federal Reserve.  
Despite the size of the assistance, Dexia continued to struggle during 2009, still troubled by 
its US portfolio and the looming crisis in Eurozone sovereign debt. In February 2010, an EU-
approved restructuring plan that required Dexia to streamline its operations and cease 
proprietary trading was announced.  
In June 2011, Dexia withdrew from the government-sponsored credit support, a supposed 
indication of financial health. In July 2011, the bank passed an EU stress test and announced 
that it had a “strong capital base.” However, just three months later, Dexia wrote down its 
substantial position in Greek debt and posted its largest loss ever. The company’s shares 
plummeted, and its Common Equity Tier 1 capital became negative. 
In order to avoid the negative systemic impacts of a disorderly dissolution of the bank, the 
Belgian, French, and Luxembourg governments nationalized the majority of Dexia’s assets. 
The EU approved the recovery plans and found that they met state aid requirements. 
However, as a result of the support required to allow for an orderly wind-down of the bank, 
the states, especially Belgium, were placed at risk for failing the EU limits on public deficits 
and faced the possibility that their credit ratings might be downgraded.  
In this module, readers will examine the attempted cross-border rescue of Dexia, a 
systemically important financial institution, and analyze the successes and failures of that 
effort. Readers should consider Dexia’s holdings of sovereign debt and how this impacted its 
viability and the ability of its host countries to rescue it. They should also seek to identify 
factors that strengthened or detracted from cross-border resolution cooperation.  
The rest of this module is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the Dexia 
Group. Section 3 discusses the impact that the 2008 financial crisis had on Dexia’s 
operations. Section 4 describes the 2008 restructuring plan. Section 5 describes the impacts 
of the European sovereign debt crisis. Section 6 discusses Dexia’s exposure to sovereign 
debt. Section 7 describes the 2011 resolution plan, and Section 8 presents conclusions about 
what has been learned from the Dexia situation. 
Questions 
1. What factors contributed to the ability of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg to 
successfully coordinate the resolution? 
2. What were the results for depositors, counterparties, shareholders, and taxpayers in 
the various countries where Dexia operated? 
3. Were there particular characteristics of Dexia’s business model that made an effective 
rescue difficult? What factors enabled or impeded its success? 
4. What does Dexia reveal about the viability of pan-European financial institutions? 
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5. What does Dexia reveal about the “circular connection” between sovereign 
governments and their significant financial institutions? 
6. Could the new EU Single Supervisory Mechanism5 have prevented Dexia’s collapse?  
7. How do these results compare to what might have been achieved through a 
coordinated resolution under the new EU Single Resolution Mechanism?6 
2. History of Dexia roup  
The Dexia Group was created in 1996 when Credit Communal de Belgique (a Belgian 
institution founded in 1860 to provide financing to local administrations) merged with 
Credit Local de France (a French institution established in 1987 to also service local 
governments). At the time of their merger, both Credit Communal de Belgique and Credit 
Local de France had expanded their services and geographic reach beyond their initial 
markets. Credit Communial de Belgium had begun to accept retail deposits from individuals 
in 1947 and in the 1990s expanded its operations into Luxembourg. Credit Local de France 
expanded its business internationally to several European countries and to the United States. 
The French bank underwent an initial public offering on the Paris Stock Exchange in 1991. 
(For more on the origins of Dexia’s precursor companies, see the company history at 
Reference for Business). 
Following the merger of the two companies in 1996, the Dexia Group became one of the first 
pan-European financial institutions.7,8 The company pursued an aggressive growth strategy 
through organic expansion and acquisitions, expanding its operations into Italy, Israel, 
Turkey, and Germany. In 2000, Dexia acquired Financial Security Assurance (FSA) a US 
provider of credit enhancement for municipal bond issuers and insurance. The acquisition 
made Dexia into the world’s leader in financial services for the public sector. Dexia also 
strengthened its retail banking, asset management and insurance services in Belgium, 
France, and Germany. This growth was funded by a 1999 dual listing of Dexia Group on the 
Brussels and Paris stock exchanges (See Figure 1 for a diagram of Dexia’s corporate 
structure.). 
By 2005, Dexia was one of the 20 largest banks in Europe with €509 billion in assets. For the 
year, it reported €2.04 billion in net profits on revenues of just under €6 billion. It operated 
two business lines. The bank’s universal banking business line (retail, asset management, 
insurance, investor services, and capital markets) was centered in Europe (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Turkey) and serviced 55 million retail customers, as well as 
institutions of all sizes. The bank’s public/project finance business, which accounted for 
more than half of its profits, operated in 30 countries (Dexia Annual Report 2006, 10). This 
part of the bank prided itself on its innovations and offered a wide variety of products and 
services to build infrastructure, such as basic lending, bond execution, highly structured 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al 2014A.  
6 See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al, 2014B.  
7 “By its location in Brussels, in the heart of the European Union office district, Dexia’s head office and its 
counterpart in Paris, the Crystal Tower, symbolize the Group’s European identity. Half of the staff of the holding 
company, Dexia Group, works in Brussels, and the other half in Paris, thereby respecting Dexia’s French and 
Belgian roots” (Dexia Annual Report 2001). 
8 See Wiggins, Tente, and Metrick (2019), European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group for 
consideration of Fortis, another cross-border financial institution battered by the financial crisis. 
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projects and credit enhancement, insurance, credit management, and asset management 
(Ibid.). 
The 2006 Strategic Plan: Two Pillars 
In late 2005 Alex Miller, former Dexia General Counsel, was appointed Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Pierre Richard, the prior CEO, was elevated to Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
The company also adopted a new management structure designed to better integrate its 
operations (See Dexia 2005 for further description of the enhanced corporate governance 
structure.) Miller and Richard were the architects of Dexia’s growth strategy. 
Figure 1: Dexia’s Corporate Structure 
 
Source: Dexia Annual Report 2001. 
 
In early 2006, the company adopted a 10-year strategic plan that clarified its vision of 
building upon its “two pillars of success.” First, Dexia would develop its universal banking 
activity beyond its traditional markets to become a leading European banking institution. 
This plan would allow the company to take advantage of the expected robust growth of the 
European market as it converged around the euro. It was also seen as providing synergies 
with its second pillar, public/project finance. 
Dexia would maintain its world leadership in public/project finance by continuing to 
strengthen its position through “geographic expansion, based on an innovative and varied 
range of products.” The target was for its historical markets (Belgium and France) to account 
for no more than a third of its earnings. Growth would be organic but the firm would also 
utilize other strategies as well (Dexia Annual Report 2007). Figure 2 shows key indicators of 
Dexia’s growth from 2005-11.   
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Figure 2: Dexia Group Key Indicators  2005-11 













2005 5,976  2,038  34.1% 508,800  11,500  2.3% 24,418 
2006 7,005  2,750  39.3% 566,700  14,400  2.5% 33,321 
2007 6,896  2,533  36.7% 604,600  16,100  2.7% 35,202 
2008 3,556  (3,326) N.A. 651,000  17,500  2.7% 36,760 
2009 6,184  1,010  16.3% 577,600  18,500  3.2% 35,234 
2010 5,310  723  13.6% 566,700  19,200  3.4% 35,200 
2011 (4,383) (11,639) N.A. 412,800  7,600  1.8% 22,461 
*All numbers in millions of euros. 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports 2005-11. 
3. Impact of the Global Financial Crisis, 2008-09  
US housing prices rose at an unprecedented rate through much of the late 1990s into the 
mid-2000s, a situation that combined with low interest rates to create a booming mortgage 
market. This market started to crash in late 2007, led by a crisis in subprime mortgages. 
Because subprime mortgages had been bundled into different forms of structured debt and 
derivatives, when defaults on subprime mortgages increased, there was widespread panic 
concerning where the risks lay and how big they were. To compensate for unknown and 
unquantifiable risks, companies began to horde cash, causing a severe contraction in the 
overnight interbank lending markets in late 2007. Because the structured debt and 
derivatives had been sold broadly in the global financial markets, the effects soon spread 
beyond the US. 
See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al 2014H for a discussion of the financial crisis and its 
worldwide effects. 
The US Subsidiary—Financial Security Assurance 
Dexia had exposure to the subprime mortgage crisis largely through its US subsidiary, 
Financial Security Assurance (FSA), a monoline insurer which operated (1) a financial 
guaranty business providing credit enhancement and insurance services related to 
residential mortgage-backed securities and (2) a financial products business which provided 
guaranteed investment contracts to municipal issuers. Like many of its counterparties, FSA 
borrowed short-term to finance long-term lending and so was severely challenged when the 
overnight credit markets dried up. 
Because FSA had largely avoided insuring the more exotic collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) backed by subprime mortgages, it was able to maintain its Aaa rating from Moody’s 
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as other companies’ securities were downgraded. (Richard 2008). Customers retreating 
from downgraded firms boosted FSA’s revenues during the first half of 2008. However, FSA 
ultimately was caught in the increasing turmoil in the markets.  
On June 23, 2008, Dexia announced that it would provide a $5 billion stand-by line of credit 
to FSA in order to quell negative rumors about its liquidity. (The company also provided a 
$500 million capital injection.) Despite this, on July 21, Moody’s Investor Service placed FSA’s 
claims-paying ability on review citing, “elevated risks with the financial guaranty insurance 
market” (Richard 2008). 
FSA continued to struggle and on November 14, 2008, Dexia announced that it had entered 
into an agreement to sell FSA’s financial guaranty insurance business to Assured Guaranty 
Ltd. The deal was facilitated by $16.9 billion in support from the Belgian and French 
governments, which assumed responsibility for FSA’s liabilities and risks. The deal and aid 
package was approved by the EU Commission.  
On November 21, 2008, Moody’s downgraded FSA to Aa3 reflecting its “view of FSA’s 
diminished business and financial profile resulting from its exposure to losses on US 
mortgage risks and disruption in the financial guaranty business more broadly” (Moody’s 
2008). 
In 2008, Dexia recorded a loss of €1.66 billion with respect to the sale of FSA, after recording 
a €1.49 billion loss at FSA from the US mortgage crisis. It also suffered value deterioration 
and impairments relating to certain counterparties in its investment portfolio, resulting in a 
fiscal year loss of €3.3 billion. Included in this figure was €810 million relating to 
adjustments on investment portfolios. Of this amount, significant sources were exposures to 
Lehman Brothers (€473 million), the Icelandic banks (€174 million) and Washington Mutual 
(€57 million) (See Dexia Annual Report 2008, 71 for further details regarding the financial 
crisis impact on Dexia.)  
Hypo Real Estate 
Throughout 2007-09, Dexia also was buffeted by exposure to Hypo Real Estate, AG, a German 
bank, and its Dublin-based subsidiary, Deutsch Pfandbriefbank (Depfa), which was a 
competitor to Dexia in the public finance arena (Duhigg 2008). Depfa also sold CDOs and 
German bonds that were backed by loans or securities issued by municipalities. When the 
bonds were downgraded, Depfa experienced difficulty raising funds to buy them back as 
required. As a result, Depfa’s liquidity became a major concern, and this concern extended 
to its parent, Hypo, which was also experiencing troubles with its real estate activities (Ibid.) 
Fearing that Hypo’s collapse might cause a chain reaction, in October 2008, the German 
government and a consortium of banks extended €50 billion to bail out Hypo (Parkin and 
Suess, 2008).  
Hypo’s problems reverberated to Dexia not only due to the signals Hypo’s distress sent about 
the public financing market, but also because Dexia had extended a multimillion euro loan to 
Depfa. However, on October 5, 2008, Dexia issued a press release contending that risks 
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related to Hypo/Depfa would have little impact on its solvency and that Dexia had adjusted 
its capital requirements to account for any adverse effects (Dexia 2008).9   
4. The 2008 Restructuring Plan 
On September 30, 2008, Dexia sought government assistance after failing to raise needed 
operating cash.10 On October 9, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg 
combined to support the bank and provide €6.4 billion of capital injection and a guarantee 
of Dexia’s liabilities and bonds up to €150 billion, divided among the countries as shown in 
Figure 3. When the bailout was announced, Dexia’s CEO Axel Miller and Board Chairman 
Pierre Richard announced their resignations.  
In addition, because it had a New York bank subsidiary, Dexia was eligible to borrow from 
the US Federal Reserve, and it did so repeatedly with a maximum outstanding amount of 
$58.5 billion.  
Figure 3: Dexia 2008 Rescue Aid 
 Belgium France Luxembourg Total 












  N/A €16.9 billion 
Source: Dexia 2008, Dexia 2008B. 
 
European Union State Aid Approval—2010 
Under the laws of the European Union, the governments of the member states are prohibited 
from injecting funds into private companies that might give them an unfair advantage. 
However, the laws do recognize that some government assistance (state aid) may be 
necessary, and it is allowed if it is within certain parameters. Such assistance by a member 
state is subject to review and adjustment by the European Commission (European 
Commission 2004). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
9 At one point, the impact to Dexia was estimated to be between €200-300 million (Tanghe 2008). Ultimately, 
however, Dexia booked a charge of €9 million relating to Hypo/Depfa bond investments but does not appear 
to have also recorded a loss on the loan; perhaps this is because of German government and private support of 
Hypo/Depfa (Dexia 2008). In December 2008, the German banking regulator began a criminal investigation of 
Hypo and Depfa, and in 2009 the German government nationalized Hypo. 
10 The effect of the crisis would be severe. Dexia’s stock price would fall from a high of €20.80 on December 31, 
2006, to €17.22 at year-end 2007, to just €3.20 at December 31, 2008. In 2008, it lost €14.655 billion in market 
capitalization, from €20.295 billion to €5.640 billion. 
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In reviewing the aid provided to Dexia, the European Commission, on November 20, 2008, 
approved the state-provided guarantees for a six-month period. With respect to the capital 
infusion, it required that a restructuring plan be submitted justifying the investment and 
preventing unfair competition. This plan was submitted in February 2009 and ultimately 
approved by the Commission on February 26, 2010.  
The plan as proposed by Dexia provided that: 
• Dexia would focus on its core banking activities and its traditional markets—Belgium, 
France, and Luxembourg.  
• Dexia would reduce its public-sector lending activity outside these markets and its 
bond portfolio, which would be ring-fenced in a specific division in the bank in line 
with a predefined write-down plan.  
• Dexia would continue to reduce its market activities and would cease proprietary 
trading. 
The Commission imposed an additional condition: 
• Dexia would also make a significant contribution to the restructuring costs by 
suspending, for two years, dividend payments on cash equities and interest payments 
on instruments constituting own funds. 
The Commission concluded that with the conditions, “the gradual cessation of certain 
activities provided for in the restructuring plan will be enough to offset the distortions of 
competition caused by the aid.”11 
5. European Sovereign Debt Crisis 2009 
The EU had always had limits applicable to sovereign debt levels and budget deficits, but 
such limits had not previously been vigorously enforced or had been creatively skirted 
through aggressive financing techniques (Nelson et al. 2012, 7; Brown and Chambers 2005). 
As countries transitioned to the euro, spreads on sovereign bonds clustered in a narrow 
range with little differentiation across the member states, even though they had very 
different economies (Mody and Sandri 2011, 3). The failure to enforce the debt levels and 
budget deficit standards led to soaring public debt in some countries (Nelson et al. 2012, 7). 
As analyst Rebecca Nelson noted: 
Many analysts agree that the crisis was caused by a set of common challenges facing 
some Eurozone countries, as well as factors specific to each country. The inflow of 
capital and subsequent build-up of public and private debt over the past decade into 
the Eurozone “periphery” countries was a key factor in the build-up to the current 
crisis. As these countries prepared to adopt the euro and transitioned from national 
currencies to the euro, their bond spreads fell dramatically, converging to the interest 
rates paid by the traditionally stronger economies of Eurozone “core” countries. 
However, as the public and private sectors in the periphery countries took advantage 
of access to new, cheap credit, the capital inflows were not always sufficiently used 
for productive investments in the economy that could generate the resources with 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 See European Commission opinion approving state guarantees (IP/08/1745) and European Commission 
opinion approving restructuring plan (IP/10/201). 
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which to repay the debt. As a result, debt levels started rising. In some countries, this 
debt was concentrated in the public sector, such as in Greece, where public finances 
were severely mismanaged. In other countries, debt accumulated in the private 
sector—such as in Ireland and Spain, which had serious banking and real estate 
bubbles. The unsustainable nature of these debts was exposed during the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, when capital markets froze up, and it became difficult 
for governments, households, and firms to access new loans and roll over existing 
debt. Additionally, the financial crisis and ensuing recession strained public finances, 
as government spending increased and tax revenues fell. In some cases, the 
government assumed private sector debt, perhaps most notably in Ireland, where the 
government guaranteed bank debt. Some governments verged towards default on 
their debt (Original footnotes omitted.) (Nelson et al., 3-4). 
The Circular Connection between EU Banks and Sovereigns 
Many observers have blamed the European debt crisis on the interrelationship of three 
elements (1) a banking crisis, (2) a sovereign debt crisis, and (3) slow growth in the EU 
economy (Shambaugh 2012, 157). This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The Three Interrelated Crises 
 
Source: Shambaugh 2012. 
 
As the financial crisis heated up, EU member states sought to respond by supporting their 
financial sectors, some of which had ballooned to become a size that dwarfed the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), as is shown in Figure 5 with respect to Dexia. 
As member states sought to raise funds to support their banks, the considerable banking 
troubles caused the market to link the sovereigns’ debt-raising with the country’s financial 
sector’s troubles. As sovereign debt came into question, so did the close linkages of many 
member states’ banks with those governments  and the recognition that many of the EU 
banks held significant amounts of their sovereign countries’ debt, creating a “vicious cycle” 
that put both governments and banks at risk. As Jay Shambaugh writes: 
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First, the sovereign debt holdings of euro-area banks are so large that if some of the 
debt-stressed sovereigns (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, hereafter 
referred to as the GIIPS) cannot pay their debts, the banking system as a whole is 
insolvent. Second, and at the same time, attempts at fiscal austerity to relieve the 
problems due to sovereign stress are slowing growth. Yet without growth, especially 
in the stressed sovereigns, the sovereign debt crisis will persist. To complete the 
circle, continued troubles for the banks could bankrupt certain sovereigns, already 
struggling under the weight of supporting the banks within their jurisdictions, and 
failure of these banks could lead to a broken credit channel, which in turn could 
become a further constraint on growth” (Shambaugh 2011, 158-9). 
Because of this phenomenon, beginning in 2008, “[a] sovereign’s spread responded 
increasingly to the weakness of its own financial sector. It was as if the sovereign’s implied 
debt burden was recalibrated as news became available about its financial sector’s likely 
claims on the public purse” (Mody and Sandri 2011, 3). 
The Grecian Meltdown 
In November 2009, Greece forecast that its public debt would hit 120.8% of its GDP, double 
the Eurozone limit of 60%. It also revised its 2009 budget deficit up to 13.6%, the second 
highest in the world relative to GDP. It was also revealed that previous governments had 
seriously underreported Greece’s budget deficit. Rating agencies downgraded Greek bank 





Figure 5: Dexia Group Assets vs. Belgium and France GDPs, 2005-2011 
Year Assets* Assets as % of GDP Belgium Assets as % of GDP France 
2005 508,761 168 30 
2006 566,743 178  31 
2007 604,564 180  32 
2008 651,006 188  29 
2009 577,630 170  31 
2010 566,735 159  29 
2011 412,759 112  21 
*All numbers in millions of euros. 
Source: Dexia Annual Reports 2005-2011; Bankscope. 
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Investors worried that Greece would not be able to meet its bond payments, and these fears 
quickly spread to other heavily indebted member states, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Cyprus, and Italy. As countries came under scrutiny, the market increased the haircuts on 
their borrowings, making it more difficult for them to pay their bonds or refinance amounts 
(Shambaugh 2012). The worries about the sovereigns who issued the debt quickly spread to 
the banks that had purchased large amounts of it, which caused widespread anxiety, since 
traditionally EU banks have held significant amounts of EU sovereign debt.12 
In May 2010, the IMF and EU member states announced a €110 billion bailout package for 
Greece in an effort to avoid its defaulting on its debt and to stave off contagion among other 
EU countries. In November, a similar package was granted to Ireland in the amount of €85 
billion. Countries receiving the bailout funds had to meet austerity measures designed to 
slow down the growth of their public sector debt. Fearful that other countries might also fail, 
Eurozone finance ministers replaced temporary measures, such as the above, with a 
permanent fund with capacity up to €500 billion, the European Stability Mechanism, to 
provide support to Eurozone member states in future crisis situations (See the BBC 
interview in which former Citigroup Chairman William Rhodes discusses Dexia, the 
Eurozone crisis, and the risk of contagion among the area’s banks). 
6. Dexia’s Sovereign Debt Exposure 
At first, Dexia’s restructuring plan of September 2008 appeared to work. It was able to quell 
a run on deposits. The company refocused on its core businesses and geographic area and 
reduced its balance sheet by 21% through sales of noncore assets (Dexia Annual Report 
2011). On June 30, 2010, Dexia announced that it was exiting the liquidity framework that 
the Belgian, French, and Luxembourg governments had provided, four months earlier than 
its original expiration date. By then, it had succeeded in raising €35.5 billion in medium and 
long-term debt (Ibid.) That same year, the bank passed the EU stress test with “flying colors.” 
A press release issued by the company on July 23 stated: “The stress test results confirm our 
view that the Group has the financial strength to weather adverse macroeconomic 
conditions”13 (Dexia 2010) (See Dexia Annual Report 2011, 1-20 for further discussion of its 
restructuring plan from 2008 to 2011). 
However, given its high concentration in public finance, it was almost inevitable that Dexia 
would be impacted by the brewing sovereign debt crisis. As soon as the solvency of Greece 
and other Eurozone countries began to be questioned, rumors abounded regarding Dexia’s 
stability. Dexia had a €3.4 billion exposure to Greek sovereign bonds at the end of 2009, as 
reported on its EU stress test documentation, and had a credit risk exposure to the country 
of €4.8 billion. It also had additional exposure of about €20 billion to the debt of Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and other troubled EU countries (See Figure 6).  
During the summer of 2011, Dexia’s access to funding began to evaporate. On October 4, 
2011, Dexia announced a €4 billion loss, the biggest in its history, largely due to writing down 
its significant holdings of Greek debt. At the same time, it announced that it had once again 
appealed to the Belgian, French, and Luxembourg governments for assistance. Dexia shares 
sank 22% in a day, closing at just above €1. Customers withdrew €300 million from the bank. 
Moody’s announced that it would consider lowering the firm’s ratings. As a result, on October 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12 See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al. 2014B for more discussion of the bank-sovereign debt feedback loop.  
13 See YPFS case Wiggins, et al. 2014A for discussion of the European Union bank stress tests. 
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5, trading in Dexia shares was halted on the Euronext stock exchange at the request of its 
Belgian regulator while a resolution was devised.  
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Figure 6: Dexia Sovereign Debt Exposure 2009 
 Debt (in millions of euros) 
Debt as % of Dexia’s 2010 common 
equity 
Italy 15,831 82.5% 
Germany 12,069 62.9% 
Belgium 4,980 25.9% 
Greece 3,462 18.0% 
France 2,300 12.0% 
Poland 2,276 11.9% 
Eastern Europe non-EEA 2,097 10.9% 
Portugal 1,927 10.0% 
Austria 1,789 9.3% 
Hungary 1,770 9.2% 
Japan 1,624 8.5% 
Spain 1,455 7.6% 
All Others 5,899 30.6% 
Totals 57,479 299.3% 
Source: EBA 2011.   
7. The 2011 Dexia Resolution Plan 
On October 10, 2011, for a second time in three years, the governments of Belgium, France, 
and Luxembourg announced a plan to save the bank, detailed in Figure 7. The Belgian 
government would purchase Dexia Bank Belgium, Dexia’s Belgian retail bank, for €4 billion. 
A Qatari investment group would buy its Luxembourg private banking unit, and the rest of 
the bank would be wound down. While it was anticipated that some additional assets and 
operations might be sold, the majority of its troubled assets, including a €95 billion bond 
portfolio, would be isolated in a “bad bank,” supported by 10-year government guarantees 
totaling €90 billion. The guarantee was apportioned among the supporting countries as 
follows: €54.45 billion (60.5%) from Belgium, €32.85 billion (36.5%) from France, and €2.7 
billion (3%) from Luxembourg (See BBC News Briefs, Dexia Bank gets huge bailout; 
Blenkinsop and Laurent 2011). 
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Figure 7: Dexia 2011 Recovery Plan 
 Belgium* France* Luxembourg* Total* 
Sale of Dexia Bank 
Belgium 4.00 N/A N/A 4.00 
10-year guarantees to 
bond portfolio isolated in 








Total 58.45 32.85 2.70 94.00 
*All amounts in billions of euros.  
Source: Dexia 2011A. 
 
On October 17, 2011, the European Commission granted temporary approval of the rescue 
aid for Dexia Bank Belgium and opened an in-depth state aid investigation. Ultimately, on 
December 21, 2012, the European Commission approved the restructuring plan, finding that 
the support was acceptable as the entities were exiting the market (with the exception of 
Dexia Bank Belgium).  
On November 9, 2011, Dexia reported that it was likely to record a €11 billion loss for the 
year, including a €4.07 billion loss from the sale of its Belgium bank and €2.32 billion loss 
from writing down its Greek bonds at a 55% discount. Despite this, it also reported at the 
end of December 2011 that its maximum exposure to credit risk from Greek government 
bonds, after the write-down, was still €747 million.  
The Aftermath  
As of December 31, 2013, the Dexia Group remained 94% state-owned by the Belgian (just 
over 50 %) and French (44.40 %) governments. The remaining management continued to 
wind down the bank’s portfolio of bonds. The company no longer had any commercial 
activities and had disposed of the majority of its operating entities. Dexia’s balance sheet had 
shrunk from €413 billion at the end of 2011, to €357 billion at the end of 2012, to €223 
billion and year-end 2013. It was the largest run-off for a banking group in Europe. Eighty-
six percent of its portfolio was investment grade, and the portfolio was by nature one of long-
term commitments. Its plan of orderly resolution sets out a trajectory for its asset portfolio 
to be reduced to €91 billion by 2020 and to €15 billion by 2038 (Dexia Group Annual Report 
2013, 4-7). 
Pursuant to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the European Central Bank conducted a 
comprehensive assessment (asset review and stress test) of Dexia and released its report on 
October 24, 2014.14 Dexia was the only bank in resolution that was subject to the 
comprehensive assessment, and on November 1, 2014, it became subject to direct 
supervision by the European Central Bank (See Dexia 2014). 
The retail banking unit purchased by the Belgian government changed its name to Belifius 
and continues to operate under that name as of June 2014.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
14 See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al. 2014A for a description of the Comprehensive Assessment. 
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8. Lessons Learned  
In March 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a Report and 
Recommendations of the cross-border Bank Resolution Group that included an analysis of 
the Fortis (Belgium)15, Dexia (Belgium), Kaupthing (Iceland),16 and Lehman Brothers (US)17 
resolutions. The report highlighted the shortcomings of the cross-border crisis resolution 
frameworks among the European member states and cited “group structure, liquidity, and 
information sharing among supervisors as examples where improvements are needed” 
(Basel Committee 2010, 10). 
Specifically with respect to the Dexia resolution, the Committee made the following findings:  
• The tension between the cross-border nature of a group and the domestic focus of 
national frameworks and responsibilities for crisis management does not necessarily 
lead to a break-up of the firm along national lines. . . .In general terms, the division of 
the burden for guarantees among the three national authorities was premised on the 
proportions of share ownership held by the institutional investors and public 
authorities of the three countries. 
• Therefore, while the centralization of liquidity management within a cross-border 
group could lead to some tensions in case of liquidity problems, these tensions can be 
overcome by adequate cooperation between the relevant central banks. 
• The cross-border nature of the group makes the resolution process more time-
consuming, but this problem is not insurmountable in a case in which home and host 
authorities clearly state their joint support to the group (Ibid., 11). 
The Committee’s recommendations informed the recent changes in the EU bank supervisory 
laws (See YPFS case study Wiggins, et al. 2014A for a description of these changes). New 
bank resolution rules, including a uniform set of resolution tools and increased cross-border 
cooperation and information sharing were also adopted and are discussed in YPFS case study 
Wiggins, et al. 2014B. 
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